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Potholes on the Level Playing Field-The




The recent evolution of the judicial articulation of the duties of cor-
porate directors during hostile battles for corporate control has placed
corporate law at a crossroads between guiding directors to exploit their
business experience and expertise on the one hand, and mechanically dic-
tating their decision-making on the other. Although some directors
might prefer the security of mechanical rules amid the turmoil of a hos-
tile takeover bid, it is clear that such rules are not a preferable goal for
corporate law.
The business judgment of independent corporate directors is argua-
bly the shareholders' best protection from abuses of the corporate ma-
chinery from both within and without. The exercise of that judgment is
seriously impaired if rendered mechanical by rigid legal doctrine imposed
by courts applying 20/20 hindsight.
This crossroads is creating a dilemma for counsel as well. It is fun-
damental that corporate decisions should be made by the directors
elected by shareholders. The role of corporate counsel should be to
guide, not dictate, a board's application of business judgment. As the
courts have looked at boardroom tactics in the takeover context, deci-
sions have come dangerously close to altering the traditional and proper
role of directors and their counsel.
A good example of these cross-currents is the application of the
"level playing field" concept to hostile takeover bids and the negotiations
with "friendly" bidders that often result from threatened hostile take-
overs. The courts have created and applied the level playing field con-
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cept to require that, once a company is for sale, all bidders be given equal
opportunity to buy control.I The concept arose in an effort to assure
shareholders of a target company of receiving optimal value for their
shares by deterring boards of directors from favoring management-con-
nected bidders over less friendly bidders.2 The level playing field was ap-
parently designed as a corollary to the directors' duty to maximize
shareholder value in the sale of a target company, not as a mechanical
rule to be applied at the commencement of bids for the target.
I. Evolution of the Level Playing Field Concept
A board of directors, faced with an unsolicited takeover offer, has a
right to reject the offer and to adopt defensive measures that are appro-
priate under the circumstances. 3 The mandates of the level playing field
come into play only if the target board decides that the company is for
sale and begins dealing with one or more interested bidders.
4
The requirement of equal treatment of bidders was clearly articu-
lated in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,5 when the battle
for control of Revlon spilled over into the courtrooms of Delaware. In
the litigation between Revlon and Pantry Pride, the Delaware Supreme
Court endorsed a variety of defensive measures adopted by the Revlon
board at a time when the board believed, in good faith and upon reason-
able investigation, that the price offered by a hostile bidder was grossly
inadequate. 6 That decision thus reaffirmed the view that directors may
reject inadequate bids and refuse to negotiate with hostile bidders. In-
deed, as was the case recently with Lucky Stores' rebuff to Asher
Edelman or Newmont Mining's recent refusal to deal with T. Boone
Pickens, a board may decline to negotiate with a hostile bidder and at the
same time substantially restructure the corporation through a sale of as-
sets, a self-tender offer, or through other business strategies.
7
1. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1986); Edelman v. Fruehauf, 798 F.2d 882, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1986); Samjens Partners I v.
Burlington Industries, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 623-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Revlon, Inc. v. Ma-
cAndrew & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
2. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-84.
3. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (self-
tender); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (shareholder rights plan).
4. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., Civ. No. 9281
at 43 (Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 1987).
5. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-85.
6. Id. at 180-81.
7. See, e.g., SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1248 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(sale of assets and purchase of own shares in open market while hostile offer outstanding);
Pogo Producing Co. v. Northwest Indus., Inc., No. H-83-2667, slip op. (S.D. Tex. May 24,
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The court in Revlon also addressed the issue of equal treatment of
bidders. It reasoned that, when it becomes inevitable that a company
must be sold, the duty of the board changes
from the preservation of [the company] as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders'
benefit .... The whole question of defensive measures [becomes]
moot. The directors' role change[s] from defenders of the corporate
bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-
holders at a sale of the company.8
The court went on to invalidate key "no-shop" and "lock-up" provi-
sions of a friendly deal negotiated between Revlon and the Forstmann
leveraged buy-out firm.9 Ruling against provisions that halted, rather
than enhanced, bidding for Revlon, the court identified preferential treat-
ment given the friendly suitor (Forstmann) over the hostile bidder (Pan-
try Pride). "Forstmann was given every negotiating advantage that
Pantry Pride had been denied: cooperation from management, access to
financial data, and the exclusive opportunity to present merger proposals
directly to the board of directors." 10 The court went on to hold that such
unequal treatment was impermissible under the circumstances:
Favoritism for a white knight to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder
might be justifiable when the latter's offer adversely affects shareholder
interests, but when bidders make relatively similar offers or dissolution
of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot fulfill their
enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with contending
factions. I
The level playing field concept further evolved in 1986, when arbi-
trageur Asher Edelman sought to acquire control of Fruehauf Corpora-
1983) (self-tender); Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (self-tender); see also Ivanhoe Partners, Civ.
No. 9281 at 42-43 (Revlon duties do not arise even when target announces large dividend,
restructures company, and enters into standstill agreement allowing third party to acquire
49% of target's stock); Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak, 656 F. Supp. 209, 228 (S.D. Ohio 1987)
(Revlon duties do not arise if directors do not commit to selling any part or all of corporation);
Gelco v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 847 (D. Minn. 1986) (Revlon duties do not arise
with an all cash offer or restructuring plan including self-tender and sale of preferred stock to
target corporation's financial officer). The author and his firm were counsel to Lucky Stores,
Inc. in connection with the Edelman offers and subsequent litigation.
8. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. But see Jewel Cos. v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, 741
F.2d 1555, 1562 (9th Cir. 1984) (California has rejected the "auction model in regulating nego-
tiated acquisitions").
9. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-84.
10. Id. at 184.
11. Id. The court's allusion to "enhanced Unocal duties" refers to the holding of the
Unocal court that, when directors are confronted with an inherent conflict of interest (as in the
purchase of shares with corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate policy), they must
show reasonable grounds for their belief "that a danger to corporate policy or effectiveness
existed because of another person's stock ownership." Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954-55.
tion. The Fruehauf board of directors refused to talk to Edelman and
hastily negotiated a friendly leveraged buy-out (LBO) with a group con-
sisting of Fruehauf management and Merrill Lynch. Edelman again
asked to negotiate and promised to better his offer. The board continued
to snub him. Edelman filed suit in federal court, claiming that the
board's tactics were a breach of fiduciary duty.12 The court agreed, and
the lower court enjoined consummation of the friendly LBO pending di-
rect negotiations with Edelman. The court reasoned that
[b]y simultaneously willy-nilly approving the management leveraged
buy-out, erecting barriers to alternative offers, and refusing to negoti-
ate two offers from the Edelman group . . . the Fruehauf directors
unquestionably all have breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care.13
The court also enjoined the use of corporate assets to pay commitment
fees or otherwise to further the management-connected bid. The order
was affirmed on appeal. 14
II. The Level Playing Field in Practice
Unwelcome bidders for corporate control have seized the level play-
ing field doctrine as a means of exerting pressure on target directors.
They cite the court rulings in an attempt to force reluctant boards to
come to the bargaining table and negotiate a deal or to surrender confi-
dential corporate information concerning the value of the target's busi-
ness-data that is often crucial to the structuring of highly leveraged
takeovers, in which financing commitments are predicated on the ulti-
mate sale of corporate assets as the projected means of paying down debt.
These bidders argue that the only way to induce them to increase the per-
share price of their offers is to provide them with such information and to
deal with them on the same basis as other bidders.
These situations raise the problematic question of whether the doc-
trine of the level playing field should have a mechanical application, or
whether it should be only a corollary to the directors' overriding duty of
maximizing shareholder value. Stated another way, should the com-
mencement of bids for the target company mechanically trigger applica-
tion of a duty to disclose to and to deal equally with all bidders?
While the concept is alluringly simple and seemingly equitable, it is
debatable whether a level playing field is the best place to score points for
shareholders. In the real world, shareholders may actually be better
12. Edelman v. Fruehauf, No. 71,332, transcript op. at 1-13 (E.D. Mich. July 24, 1986).
13. Id. at 18.
14. Fruehauf 798 F.2d at 889-91.
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served if the playing field appears to be tilted away from a raider. A
target board may, for example, actually induce better offers for the target
company by refusing to discuss an unreasonably low offer, by publicly
announcing friendly negotiations with others, or by announcing an intent
to look for "alternatives," while seemingly ignoring the option of negoti-
ating with the hostile raider. Indeed, in the attempted takeover of
Safeway in 1986, the Dart Group unilaterally indicated that it would
raise its hostile bid by some six dollars per share (over $300 million)
when the Safeway board refused to talk to Dart and publicly announced
that it was looking for alternatives. 15
These are only a few of many well-accepted negotiation tactics used
outside the takeover arena. Their wide use and potential for success ar-
gue strongly that the level playing field concept should not be interpreted
to preclude such tactics so long as the board's honest objective is consis-
tent with its duty to protect the shareholders' right to the highest achiev-
able value in a sale of the company.
Perhaps even more fundamentally, one needs to ask whether the
level playing field concept should be applied to teams armed with differ-
ent weapons. It matters little how level the playing field is if one team
has tanks and the other only bows and arrows. If the level playing field
concept ignores certain common differences between friendly suitors and
hostile bidders, shareholders may well be victimized.
Two such differences are particularly significant. First, friendly
suitors commonly agree to protect the confidentiality of inside corporate
information and to refrain from using such information to launch an of-
fer not approved by the board (a hybrid confidentiality and standstill
agreement). Second, friendly suitors rarely have acquired a large stake in
the target prior to negotiations.
These distinctions can play out in a variety of important ways. For
example, a hostile bidder, unrestrained by a promise of confidentiality,
may use the disclosure of sensitive information not to negotiate, but
rather to circulate financiers in order to obtain financing commitments
for an offer considered unfair or inadequate by the target board. In an
extreme case, such disclosure may result in termination of a tender offer
and acquisition of a stock position threatening a stalemate and prevent-
ing a sale of the target company.' 6 In other cases, the information may
15. The author and his firm represented Safeway in connection with the Dart proposals
and subsequent litigation.
16. Some states require by statute that a merger be approved by at least 66% of the
outstanding shares of the company. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3(2) (West 1969);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2027(i) (1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 170.78(F) (Anderson 1985).
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even dampen the raider's enthusiasm for bidding higher.
Opening a company's books to a raider may deter the bidding pro-
cess it was intended to foster. A friendly suitor may decide not to spend
the time and money needed to prepare a bid if it knows that the raider,
who usually has the advantage of having purchased a large block of stock
at lower, pre-offer prices, has identical information. Moreover, the
raider's stock position usually gives it a locked-in profit no matter whose
bid succeeds in obtaining control. A friendly bidder has no such guaran-
tee of a fall-back profit. Thus, if agreements to pay sums to or reimburse
expenses of the friendly suitor in return for a firm bid ("hello fees"), or to
pay a sum or reimburse expenses if a sweetened bid by the raider exceeds
the friendly bid ("break up fees"), are disallowed on the basis of the level
playing field concept, then the raider's prior stock position and its jump
on obtaining financing for its bid may give it an unchallengeable advan-
tage and serve to deter further bidding.
III. The Burlington Decision
The federal court in the Southern District of New York addressed
these countervailing considerations in connection with the battle for con-
trol of Burlington Industries, which was initiated by a hostile tender offer
for Burlington by Samjens Acquisitions Corp., a vehicle of Asher
Edelman and Dominion Textile.' 7 When Edelman became aware that
the Burlington board was exploring alternatives to his offer, he asked to
be provided with any information that might justify a higher price for
Burlington as well as any other information provided by the Burlington
directors to other interested parties. A week later, when Edelman sus-
pected that a competing offer was being considered, he demanded the
opportunity to review and improve upon any other bid. Burlington man-
agement offered to comply with these requests, but only if Edelman
signed a confidentiality agreement. He refused. When the board ac-
cepted a higher bid from Morgan Stanley, Edelman sought an injunction.
Edelman challenged the board's action of signing a merger agreement
with Morgan Stanley, which included a break-up fee and a limited no-
shop provision. Is
The court, however, supported the Burlington board, finding that
the failure to deal evenhandedly with Edelman was "justified."
In such a case, the raider can create a stalemate by accumulating in the open market more
than 34% of the outstanding shares, thus enabling the raider to block any merger that the
target's board may try to negotiate with a third party.
17. Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 616 (1987).
18. Id. at 617-21.
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Management had offered to provide Edelman with the same informa-
tion it had given other interested parties, but Edelman refused to sign a
confidentiality agreement. Edelman wanted to be informed of other
bids before he bid, but the board justifiably thought it would be unwise
to do so. The board did not deal selectively with Edelman. Instead, he
dealt selectively with the board, according to his own rules. Nor did
the board freeze Edelman out of the auction. The merger agreement
the board signed did not end the auction, it provided a starting point
for further bidding. Edelman was free to-and did-raise his bid after
it was signed. If the board was unfair with Edelman, it was only be-
cause it forced him to dig deeper into his pockets to the benefit of
Burlington shareholders. 19
The court also rejected Samjens' complaints that Burlington had
treated Samjens unfairly by denying a break-up fee. Samjens had entered
into the bidding process with a nearly $80 million advantage, due to a
pretender purchase of thirteen percent of Burlington shares. By refusing
to pay Samjens a break-up fee, Burlington had helped even the playing
field.
In Burlington, the board acted to secure a higher bid that was firm
and adequately financed. The board did not preclude other bidders, but
recognized that it had to pay a price to obtain a competing bid. The
decision in Burlington correctly recognizes that the level playing field is
not a mechanistic rule, but a principle to be applied only with due regard
to the particular circumstances. It recognizes the realities of the market-
place for corporate control and the desirability of giving corporate
boards ample room to apply their business judgment.
The decision is also comforting to corporate counsel. It implicitly
recognizes that there is no best way to get the best price for shareholders
and endorses counsel's role in providing guidance and context. It allows
counsel to provide direction without dictating negotiating tactics or strat-
egy or otherwise impeding the board's exercise of its business judgment.
Conclusion
Recent rulings have put enormous pressure on boards of directors.
In a hostile takeover contest, boards often feel they are faced with a no-
win situation: They must either create a level playing field or risk poten-
tial lawsuits brought by either hostile raiders or angry shareholders, to
which the courts will apply 20/20 hindsight. Yet the record of boards of
directors in securing enormous increases in value for shareholders has
been remarkable. Tying the hands of directors and corporate counsel
19. Id. at 625-26.
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with rigid and mechanistic rules that ignore the realities of the corporate
world can only impair that record.
